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Abstract
The question of damages for failure to pay sums due came before the House of Lords in 2007 in 
the Sempra case. Although not the main ground of the decision, the House stated that a claimant 
would succeed, if the claimant satisfied the usual tests of ‘remoteness’ of loss. The article shows 
how difficult and thus expensive it is to reach what to most is an obvious result, underlining the 
importance of particular judges, and that counsel need to ‘know’ the judges before whom they 
argue a case. People might well conclude that the Sempra ruling covers failure by insurers to pay 
insurance money on time. The article explains why it does not, with reference to leading cases, 
including those supporting a bizarre rule of English insurance contract law concerning the nature 
of insurance cover. The article then considers the likely response to the issue in other countries of 
common law, and how it might be seen in Europe. The article concludes that English law needs 
reform – not new precedent, but new legislation, and the chance that through current work at the 
Law Commission, this will occur.
Keywords: contract; failure to pay money on time; failure to pay insurance money on time; 
nature of insurance cover; doctrine of precedent.
1 Late Payment at Large
The question of damages under the general law (damages payable for failure to pay 
money) has been an issue in some countries, notably in England, for some time. This 
issue came before the House of Lords in 2007 in Sempra.1 The House of Lords (Judicial 
Committee) was the highest court of law in England until it was replaced in that role 
on 1 October 2009 by the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The leading judgment on 
this point in Sempra, one of several judgments, began: ‘with the broad proposition of 
English law that as a general rule a claimant can recover damages for losses caused by 
a breach of contract or a tort which satisfy the usual remoteness tests’ (emphasis added), 
but continued: this ‘broad common law principle is subject to an anomalous, that is, 
unprincipled, exception regarding … claims for interest losses by way of damages for 
breach of a contract to pay a debt’.2
 Readers in other parts of Europe might be astonished that such a fundamental point 
should still be an expensively litigious issue at all. Moreover, they may well be surprised 
that five of the most senior judges in England should (be obliged to) reconsider cases 
decided over a century ago to reach such an obvious conclusion. Be that as it may, 
in Sempra the House of Lords reviewed the history of the ‘anomaly’,3 and concluded 
(according to the leading judgment of Lord Nicholls) that they should now ‘erase the 
remains of this blot on English common law jurisprudence’, and that those who ‘default 
on a contractual obligation to pay money are not possessed of some special immunity 
* Emeritus Professor of Commercial Contract Law, University of Cambridge.
1 Sempra Metals v Inland Revenue [2007] UKHL 34, [2008] 1 AC 561. Sempra (its parent company is 
resident in Germany) traded in metals listed on the London Metal Exchange. The main issue in the case 
concerned advance corporation tax and the EC Treaty. The case was a test claim under a group litigation 
order made to manage the numerous claims brought against the Inland Revenue as a result of the decision 
in Hoechst AG v Inland Revenue Commissioners (case 410/98) [2001] Ch 620.
2 At 74. For the ‘usual remoteness test’ in the event of breach of contract, English lawyers still cite a test 
originating in the ‘rule’ in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341.
3 Especially the decisions of the House of Lords in London, Chatham and Dover Ry Co v SE Ry Co 
[1893] AC 429 (which concerned the issue of whether interest was recoverable under an Act of 1833) and 
President of India v La Pintada Cia Nav SA [1985] AC 104 (which concerned a claim to recover exchange 
currency losses as damages for late payment of demurrage). However, the review of Lord Nicholls started 
with the judgment of the Court of King’s Bench in Page v Newman (1829) 9 B & C 378, and also included 
two twentieth century decisions of the Court of Appeal.
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in respect of losses caused thereby’. However, the House of Lords confirmed that, to be 
recoverable, ‘the losses suffered by a claimant must satisfy the usual … tests. The losses 
must have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract as liable to result from 
the breach’.4 
2 Late Payment of Insurance Money
This welcome reform of the general law did not, however, directly address failure to pay 
insurance money. If a claimant urgently needs the insurance money due, for example, 
in order to buy another van for his or her business to replace the one which was stolen, 
or to repair the factory essential to the business, the law should surely be the same. It 
is precisely in such circumstances that the effect of the theft or fire on the business has 
an impact on credit, and makes it difficult or expensive for the insured to raise money 
pending payment by the insurer. However, the law does not share this view. In England5 
in 2012, if the insurer pays late, however extensive and predictable the damage to 
the insured’s business, the latter is not compensated for the damage; the balance of 
precedent in the reported insurance cases (the relevant source of law given that there is 
no relevant statute) is against the insured who seeks full compensation as damages from 
the insurer in breach.6
 The search for relevant precedent starts not in the nineteenth century, but in 1987, 
with the Gemstones case.7 In this decision of the Court of Appeal, it was settled that, for 
a breach of the duty of good faith, a duty central to all insurance and which might have 
had implications for payment, no damages could be awarded. In any event, the judicial 
establishment in England seems to regard any such a duty of good faith with suspicion, 
and as a concept too vague to be useful.8 Be that as it may, the Court did not consider 
the precise possibility of awarding damages in a claim for late payment of debt.
 Following this is the controversial decision of Hirst J in the Italia Express.9 The 
ship of that name was undergoing repairs near Piraeus, Greece, when she exploded and 
sank. The cause was unusual and unexpected – the detonation of explosives strapped 
to the hull! In these circumstances the subsequent hull insurance claim was ‘robustly’ 
defended; in court, and therefore in public, the owner was subjected to eight days of 
cross-examination by counsel, an interrogation which carried the inevitable implication 
of fraud. Undoubtedly, fraud was and still is a major problem for insurers, and sometimes 
they are justifiably slow to pay while suspicious; however, if their suspicion cannot 
4 [At 92]; and these losses ‘will be recoverable, subject to the principles governing all claims for damages 
for breach of contract, such as remoteness, failure to mitigate and so forth’ [at 94]. Broadly speaking, other 
members of the House, such as Lord Hope (a Scots judge) agreed with Lord Nicholls. Note that the formula 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ is that used in the law of tort, whereas the law of contract usually refers to what is 
in the ‘reasonable contemplation’ of the parties.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, England refers to the United Kingdom of England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
6 Notably Sprung v Royal Ins Co (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 111 (CA) which is considered further 
below.
7 Banque Financière de la Cité v Westgate Ins Co [1990] QB 665 (CA), affirmed mainly on other 
grounds: [1991] 2 AC 249. The Court of Appeal reversed a decision of Steyn J (as he then was): [1987] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 69.
8  See for example the opinion of a current member of the Supreme Court, Lord Mance ‘The 1906 Act, 
Common Law and Contract Clauses – All in Harmony?’, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
3, at 352 (2011). Orthodoxy maintains that there is no general duty of good faith in English contract law: 
see G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (2007) at 7-102. However, in Socimer v Standard Bank London 
[2008] EWCA Civ 116, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 558 [at 116], concerning a contract to value assets, Rix LJ 
referred to a general ‘requirement of good faith and rationality’ and stated: ‘Commercial contracts assume 
such good faith, which is why express language requiring it is so rare.’ A similar view has been expressed 
in Australia by: E. Peden ‘Implicit Good Faith – or Do We Still Need an Implied Term of Good Faith?’ 
25 Journal of Contract Law 1, at 50-61 (2009); and by J. Allsop, 85 Australian Law Journal Reports 6, at 
341-361 (2011). Cf. Aikens LJ, BILA Journal No 119 at 12, (June 2010) that there is a universal principle 
that insurance policyholders ‘must not act in bad faith’. Clearly, English law on good faith is not clear, but 
to English lawyers the same appears true of comparable law in France and Germany!
9 Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 281. 
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be proved they must pay – sooner or later.10 The angry owner of the Italia Express 
countered with an action for damages for non-payment.11 Hirst J rejected his action on 
two grounds. One concerned the Marine Insurance Act 190612 and the other, the point of 
present concern, was that the common law also led to the same conclusion: no damages 
could be awarded for non-payment. His decision rested on an earlier case in the House 
of Lords, The Fanti.13
3 Clouding the Issue
A premise of The Fanti was that under contracts of insurance, the obligation of insurers, 
in the event of insured loss, was to ensure that policy holders be ‘held harmless’.14 
Commonly cited for such a rule is the statement in the House of Lords by Lord Goff, a 
highly respected judge both then and now, that the promise of insurance indemnity is ‘a 
promise to hold the indemnified person harmless against a specified loss or expense’.15 
Doubtless ‘hold harmless’ meant something to Lord Goff and to insurance lawyers of 
that era but policyholders today would probably scratch their heads and wonder. Indeed 
even judges of that era, even Lord Goff perhaps, might well scratch their heads at the 
latest interpretation of the phrase in the Supreme Court, albeit not in an insurance case 
and thus of no immediate concern.16
 Lord Mance, a senior judge of today, recently referred to ‘the fiction that the insurer 
contracts to hold the insured harmless’,17 and went on to say that in reality ‘the insurer 
may be in no position to prevent the specified peril materialising – take, for example, 
the explosives attached to the vessel in Piraeus’ (in the Italia Express). To most people 
today the phrase is, to say the least, unhelpful. Indeed, importantly, it is a fiction that 
is contrary to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties, whatever the kind of 
contract.18 Much more in line with what reasonable men and women might expect, 
Lord Mance concluded that ‘both parties to an insurance case would probably see the 
real obligation of an insurer as the paying of a valid claim after a reasonable period 
for investigation’.19 Indeed, the Law Commission is currently considering, and likely 
to recommend, statute law that requires insurers to pay insurance money within a 
10 Apparently on the ground that of the fact that evidence of fraud (surreptitious tape recordings) was 
inadmissible.
11 Including damages for mental distress. Generally such damages are not available for non-payment of 
insurance money; however, this rule is currently being reconsidered by the Law Commission.
12 Sections 67 and 68.
13 Firma SA v Newcastle P & I Association (The Fanti) [1991] 2 AC 1.
14 An interpretation by Hirst J in Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) that some commentators claim to have been 
taken too far out of its context. In those terms, the basic premise of insurance is indeed controversial.
15 The Fanti, at 35 (emphasis added). In other words, the instant that insured loss such as fire occurs the 
insurer is in breach of contract and liable pay damages. The rule in Scotland, however, is not bizarre but 
‘normal’; see Scott Lithgow Ltd v Secretary of State for Defence (1989) 45 BLR 1, at 8: a decision of the 
House of Lords sitting as the final court of appeal (not for England but) for Scotland. 
 In this connection, see New Cap Re v Grant [2008] NSWSC 1015, (2008) 221 FLR 164 [at 87 ff.], 
which contains extensive and erudite discussion of Australian cases and of (mostly early) English cases. 
The court concluded [at 109 ff.] that in the case of reinsurance, at least the insurer’s obligation was not to 
pay damages, but one of debt.
16 In Farstad Supply v Envirico [2010] UKSC 18 (Sc), [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 387, an oil rig supply vessel 
was chartered by the owner to a hirer under a contract that obliged the owner to ‘hold harmless’ the hirer 
against certain claims and liabilities; on this see W. Courtney, ‘Indemnities, Exclusions and Contribution’, 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 3, at 339, (2011).
17 Mance, above n. 8, at 349 (emphasis added).
18 A ‘theme that runs through our law of contract is that the reasonable expectations of honest men must 
be protected. It is not a rule or a principle of law. It is the objective which has been and still is the principal 
moulding force of our law of contract’: Steyn LJ in First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International 
Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194, 196 (CA); and as regards expectations (of some eminently reasonable 
judges) in insurance cases see Lord Lloyd in Cook v Financial Ins Co Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1765, 1768 (HL); 
and Lord Bingham in The Starsin, Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2003] UKHL 12; 
[2004] 1 AC 715, [at 12]. 
19 Mance, above n. 8, at 349. The fact, which he acknowledged, that the law ‘currently allows the situation 
where an insurer may delay dealing with a claim to his own financial benefit, at least in cash-flow terms, 
118 maLcoLm cLarke 
reasonable time.20 This is obviously important, but the decision in The Fanti clouded 
the issue in the sense of colouring insurance law payment as special and different from 
contract law in general.
4 Sprung
The next and most notorious case on the issue of damages for late payment of insurance 
money is Sprung.21 It was decided in 1995, but not reported until 1999, and judicially 
described as ‘notorious’ in 2010.22 In Sprung, a senior judge, one who is still active and 
respected in the world of commercial litigation today,23 gave the leading judgment. He 
acknowledged that the Court had not heard full or detailed argument on the point,24 but 
had nonetheless ‘no hesitation’ in holding that ‘there is no cause of action in damages 
for late payment of what may be held due as damages’.25 The relevance of this dictum 
concerning what is ‘due as damages’ lies in the bizarre rule of English insurance law 
(referred to above) that payment of insurance money is not payment of a debt (in respect 
of an insured loss), but payment of damages (compensation) for failure to perform ‘a 
promise to hold the [insured] harmless against a specified loss or expense’.
 Senior and respected as he may be, the judge in Sprung was, in my view and that 
of other commentators, mistaken.26 The mistake rested partly on his view of precedent, 
of the correctness of a dictum of another judge in a different context, that there is ‘no 
such thing as a cause of action in damages for late payment of damages’.27 Today, after 
Sempra, it is at least open to debate that Sprung should be disregarded, and that another 
‘blot on English common law’ be erased. It could be argued that the law in England 
should be restored in line with the wider common law fold: as we shall see, damages for 
late payment by insurers have been awarded in other common law jurisdictions.
 Other cases, relevant perhaps, are technically distinguishable according to the English 
doctrine of precedent.28 If a man employs an intermediary, such as an insurance broker, 
to obtain insurance for him, the intermediary is liable in England for failure to do so and 
insurance money which would have been recoverable from the insurer is recoverable 
from the intermediary.29 Damages recoverable will include any loss through not having 
had the money in time when the insurer should have paid, provided the intermediary 
had arranged a proper policy. This was decided by a lower court, the Leeds District 
Registry Mercantile Court, in a decision30 accepted as correct by at least one member 
and to the detriment of the insured, potentially putting him under financial pressure to settle, and possibly 
even out of business’ [at 349-50] was evidently something that gave him no satisfaction. 
20 See Joint Consultation Paper LCCP 201/SLCDP 152.
21 Sprung v Royal Ins Co (UK) Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 111 (CA).
22 By the Supreme Court judge Lord Mance: above n. 8, at 349. Evidently he agreed with commentators 
that the rule that emerged from Sprung was ‘anomalous’.
23 Sir Anthony Evans.
24 Because the appellant (claimant) was not represented by a barrister, but had argued the case himself.
25 At 116.
26 See e.g. J. Lowry and P. Rawlings, ‘Insurers, Claims and the Boundaries of Good Faith’, 68 Modern 
Law Journal 1, at 82-110 (2005), and J. Al-Asady, ‘Damages, Late Payment and Indemnity Insurance’, 
Journal of Business Law, [2006] 396-407. The mistake was partly that earlier decisions of the House could 
not be distinguished, decisions which have now been distinguished by the House itself in Sempra. 
27 Lord Brandon in The Lips, President of India v Lips Maritime Corp [1988] AC 395, at 424; a dictum 
pointedly attacked at the time by F.A. Mann, ‘Spycatcher in the High Court of Australia’, 104 Law Quarterly 
Review 3 (1988) to which Lord Nicholls in Sempra referred (at 75) with evident approval.
28 Cf., however, the power of the court in England to award costs not on the standard basis but on 
indemnity basis when a party behaves in litigation in a way that could be properly categorised as disgraceful 
or deserving of moral condemnation: according to Newman J in a PHI case, this might include an insurer 
which fails to investigate a claim in accordance with proper principles: Wailes v Stapleton Construction and 
Commercial Services Ltd and Unum Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 112, at 117.
29 Osman v Moss Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 313 (CA); Cherry Ltd v Allied Ins Brokers Ltd [1978] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 274; McNealy v Pennine Ins Co Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 18 (CA); Dunbar v A & B Painters 
Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 38 (CA); Ramwade Ltd v Emson & Co Ltd [1987] RTR 72 (CA). M. Clarke, The 
Law of Insurance Contracts (2009), at 9-6A.
30 Arbory v West Craven [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 491. 
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of the Supreme Court in London.31 This is law in England, and prima facie decisions 
reached in England, whether in London, Liverpool or Leeds, apply also in Scotland. 
However, in Scotland, Sprung has not been applied: courts there have applied ordinary 
contract principles.32 In this and other respects, Scotland is a different country, although 
not altogether independent, like Australia, Canada and the United States.
5 The View from Abroad: Common Law
Already in 1967, the Supreme Court of California took a very different view of the 
Sprung issue. It said33 that when:
the owner of a heavily mortgaged motel or other business property suffers 
a substantial fire loss, the owner may be placed in financial distress, may be 
unable to meet his mortgage payments, and may be in jeopardy of losing his 
property and becoming a bankrupt. A major, if not the main, reason why a 
businessman purchases fire insurance is to guard against such eventualities 
if his property is damaged by fire. Certainly, the property owner who 
purchases fire insurance may reasonably expect that if a fire occurs, the 
insurance proceeds will be promptly available to protect him from those 
eventualities. The business of the fire insurer is to provide such protection. 
Insurers are, of course, chargeable with knowledge of the basic reasons 
why fire insurance is purchased, and of the likelihood that an improper 
delay in payment may result in the very injuries for which the insured 
sought protection by purchasing the policies.
California is a long way from England – in many respects; but the immediate point is 
that California is part of the common law world. From an English perspective, Australia 
is even more part of the common law world. Decisions in Australia, especially, but 
not only, those of the High Court, are often cited with respect (though not necessarily 
applied) in England. The same is broadly true of the Federal Court of Australia; for 
example, when a business interruption insurer was late in payment, the insured managed 
to recover the cost of borrowing from a bank in order to keep his business going until 
the insurer paid.34 In Australia such a rule is now well established.35 
 In Canada, a duty of good faith (possibly one for contracts in general which has 
filtered across the border from the USA)36 has been applied to insurance contracts. In 
Canada ‘there is an implied obligation in every insurance contract that the insurer will 
deal with claims from its insured in good faith’.37 There are two aspects to the duty 
thus conceived. The first ‘obliges the insurer to act with reasonable promptness during 
31 Mance, above n. 8, at 350.
32 Strachan v Scottish Boatowners’ Mutual Ins Association [2001] ScotCS 138 (Ct Sn: OH). See also Lord 
Hoffmann in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc (The Piper Alpha) [2002] UKHL 
4, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553, [at 100], a case on appeal from Scotland in which therefore Scots law applied. 
The decision concerned a ‘contractor’s indemnity’ promised by a firm employed to maintain part of an oil 
rig which was approached by Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords as if it were an insurance claim subject 
to ordinary contract principles.
33 Reichert v General Ins Co 428 P 2D 860, 864 (1967). In this and other cases in the United States, the 
insured recovered damages in respect of consequential damage to his business (e.g. Royal College Shop 
Inc v Northern Ins Co, 895 F 2d 670 (10 Cir, 1990)) when this was such as might reasonably have been 
expected to result.
34 Tropicus Orchids v Territory Ins Office (1998) 148 FLR 441 (NT).
35 See D. Derrington and R. Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (2005), at 13–362; C. Ying ‘Damages 
for Late Payment of Insurance Claims’, 122 Law Quarterly Review, at 205-210 (2006); see also R. Andrew, 
Exceeding the Limits of Indemnity: Consequential Damages and Repudiation of Insurance Policies, 16 
Insurance Law Journal 109 (2005); and S. Drummond, ‘Damages for Consequential Loss when the Insurer 
Fails to Pay’, 16 Insurance Law Journal 128 (2005). As regards the courts, see Hungerfords v Walker 
1989 HCA 8, (1990) 171 CLR 125, [at 22] per Mason CJ. As regards neighbouring New Zealand, see New 
Zealand Ins Co Ltd v Harris [1990] 1 NZLR 10 (CA); also P. Tully, Repudiation of Insurance Contracts — 
How are Damages Assessed?, 13 Insurance Law Journal 250 (2002) and cases cited.
36 See the Restatement (2d) Contracts, section 205.
37 702535 Ontario v Lloyd’s of London (2000) 184 DLR (4th) 687 (Ont) [at 27]; applied in Fowler v 
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each step of the claims process’ because the insured ‘will frequently be under financial 
pressure to settle the claim as soon as possible in order to redress the situation’.38 The 
second aspect is that the insurer must ‘deal with its insured’s claim fairly’. The insurer 
‘must assess the merits of the claim in a balanced and reasonable manner. It must not 
deny coverage or delay payment in order to take advantage of the insured’s economic 
vulnerability or to gain bargaining leverage in negotiating a settlement’.39 Thus, for 
common law countries at large, there is hope.
6 The View from Abroad: Europe
Outside the world of common law countries, the eyes of English lawyers turn (with some 
hesitation perhaps) to Europe and the study, Principles of European Insurance Contract 
Law (PEICL),40 which was published in 2009. This is not a statement of current law, but 
in the language of law in the USA, a restatement of what a group of European scholars 
thinks the law should be (inevitably a compromise). The enquirer will find that, where 
the rule that should apply is not a particular rule of insurance contract law, the applicable 
rule will be found in the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).41 The right 
to damages found here is a general one, of the kind applied in the common law to all 
contracts.
7 The View from the Sea
Concerning damages for late payment, Lord Mance, the current member of the Supreme 
Court quoted above, said in 2010 that one response to the criticism of current law might 
be that ‘the essence of an insurance contract is that it provides only a defined amount 
of cover and that to allow open-ended damages is inimical to this’. However, he went 
on ‘it is difficult to see why defining one’s liability in respect of certain obligations … 
should preclude liability in respect of breach of another, albeit ancillary obligation, i.e. 
to pay in a reasonable time’.42 He continued: ‘A better response, perhaps, is one specific 
to the world of marine insurance. Marine insurance is contracted between parties who 
are usually better placed to look after themselves than is the case with, for example, 
consumer or small business insurance’.43 Indeed so, but except perhaps in the case of 
yachts consumers do not roam the world of marine insurance and (in my words, not 
his) the marine tail of today should not be allowed to wag the non-marine dog in the 
street, where consumers should be able to sniff something that meets their reasonable 
expectations. The undoubted and justifiable importance of marine insurance in London 
in times past is harder to justify in 2012.44 
 In any event, even in the marine context, the International Hull Clauses 2003 
require a decision on whether to pay a claim within 28 days of the receipt of sufficient 
(specified) documentation,45 and there is little doubt that, whether the case be marine or 
non-marine, a clear contract clause on the matter will be applied.46 
Maritime Life Ass Co (2002) 217 DLR (4th) 473 (Nfld) [at 45]. See also to this effect in the Canadian 
Supreme Court Whiten v Pilot Ins Co (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 257 [at 82].
38 702535 Ontario, at 28.
39 Id., at 29.
40 J. Basedow et al. (eds.) Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) (2009); and http://
www.restatement.info; the writer must confess an interest as he played a small part in the production of this 
work. An erudite study of general principles in civil law can be seen in G.H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach 
of Contract, A Comparative Account (1988), at 129 ff.
41 See PEICL Article 1:105 (2).
42 Mance, above n. 8, at 350.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 Indeed as Lord Mance observed (id.), these have not so far been factors to persuade the Law Commission 
to exclude marine insurance from the reforms currently proposed (Law Commission and Scottish Law 
Commission, Issues Paper 6: Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith (2010)). 
45 However, earlier but still current forms, such as the 1977 American Institute Hull Clauses, do not.
46 See e.g. Tonkin v UK Ins [2006] EWHC 1120, [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 283 to 341: the lengthy judgment 
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8 Conclusion
Judges are important everywhere, but readers may well wonder whether it is in England, 
where they are at the top of a league table of significance, that they matter most. When 
a potential litigant goes to a firm of solicitors, which advises him or her to litigate, the 
case is likely to be sent to counsel, a barrister. One of the reasons for this lies in the skill 
of the barrister, not only in argumentation before the court, but also in deciding whether 
and when to start proceedings, and later, to argue the case. That decision turns not on 
the weather or the bus route, but largely on the judge likely to hear argument on the 
chosen date and, in particular, on the barrister’s knowledge of the judge and the judge’s 
attitudes – his (or her) legal personality. Such information is crucial and is found mostly 
among members of the Bar.47 Ultimately, the client must trust the barrister – not only the 
barrister’s powers of argument, but also his or her powers of psychoanalysis!48 Another 
reason for sending cases to barristers lies in their skill in cutting a path through the 
jungle of precedent, a feature of the legal landscape that does little credit to the common 
law world, especially, as I have sought to show, in England.
 With regard to the rules of law on late payment by insurers, one fear in the insurance 
industry, apparently, is that claims for damages are relatively easy to advance, but time-
consuming and expensive to investigate, and that such claims might become standard 
practice. Time-consuming and expensive to investigate they may be, but only relatively 
easy to advance. The number of consumers, who have not been promptly paid, but are 
angry and dogged enough to pursue a dilatory insurer via a solicitor and barrister to the 
commercial courts, is surely small.49 
 Be that as it may, a comparative survey of England, France and Germany, as well as 
related EU Directives, concluded in early 2011 that ‘the least principled set of rules is to 
be found in England’.50 France and Germany have legislation.51 England does not and, 
surely, it is indefensible that in an area of law in which people seek reassurance, to know 
where they stand, the law cannot tell them. 
 English law needs reform – not new precedent, but new legislation. For this, there 
must be time in Parliament. Parliamentary time is hard to get. New law that is politically 
non-controversial can be accorded a fast track. This is what happened to the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill, which was before the upper chamber 
in October 2010, and became legislation in March 2012; it is expected to come into 
force in March or April 2013. The new legislation was supported by the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI). Whether the ABI would support reform of the law concerning 
late payment is open to considerable doubt! However, late payment of insurance money 
is one of the issues considered by the Law Commissions,52 which have urged Parliament 
to reform the current law. Let us hope that Parliament responds!
of HHJ Peter Coulson, QC, in the Technology and Construction Court (TCC).
47 Cf., the USA where such information is no less significant but has been published: A. Broscheid 
‘Comparing Circuits: Are Some US Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative than Others?’ 45 Law 
& Society Review 1, at 171-194 (2011).
48 Perhaps trusting experts – of all kinds notably medical advisers – face to face rather than by phone, 
Facebook, Twitter or Skype is a fundamental feature of modern life.
49 Consumers are much more likely to use the small claim jurisdiction of the lower courts or to bring 
a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the outcome is not reported in sufficient detail to 
constitute precedent and thus count as law.
50 W.H. van Boom, ‘Do Insurers Have to Pay for Bad Behaviour in Settling Claims? Legal Aspects of 
Insurers Wrongful Claims Handling’, 2 Journal of European Tort Law 1, at 101 (2011).
51  In France see L113-5 Code des Assurances; in Germany see VVG Art. 14.
52  Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, above n. 44.

